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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Country of origin labeling (COOL) has a long history in the United 
States.  The first COOL law was implemented in 1890 as part of the 
McKinley Tariff Act, which required labels on all articles of foreign 
manufacture.1  House Committee reports demonstrate that the lawmakers 
who passed the McKinley Tariff Act freely admitted the law was meant to 
establish preferential treatment for domestic goods.2  Today, meat, seafood, 
and raw food products require country of origin labels,3 and lawmakers claim 
the purpose is to meet consumers’ demand for information.4  
Regardless of its purpose, COOL creates obstacles for producers engaged 
in international trade, and these obstacles are exactly why the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was formed.5 Nations frustrated by barriers to trade 
initially addressed their concerns in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT),6 which promoted free trade by requiring nations to treat all 
trading partners equally.7  In 1979, members to the GATT established the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement)8 to further ensure 
that technical regulations would not create unnecessary obstacles between 
trading nations.9  However, the TBT Agreement leaves room for trading 
nations to pursue public objectives, like the protection of human health and 
safety, and environmental concerns.10  In furthering these objectives, the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 McKinley Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 6; see also Peter Chang, Country of Origin Labeling: 
History and Public Choice Theory, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 693, 695 (2009) (describing the 
purpose and implementation of the first COOL laws and practices enacted in the U.S.). 
 2 Chang, supra note 1, at 696. 
 3 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012).  
 4 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(stating that the “[s]upporting members of Congress identified the statute’s purpose as 
enabling customers to make informed choices based on characteristics of the products they 
wished to purchase”). 
 5 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [WTO], UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9–10 (5th ed. 
2015), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/understanding_e.pdf 
(explaining the purposes of the WTO). 
 6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
 7 WTO, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
 8 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
 9 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 31; Technical Information on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e. 
htm.  
 10 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 31.  
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WTO allows countries to use potentially invalid “technical regulations” 
under the TBT, as long as the regulations are not “more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil [sic] a legitimate objective.”11  
Despite the permissive exception for regulations aimed at consumer 
protection, the U.S.’ COOL regulations for packaged meat have not avoided 
legal challenges.  Since their adoption, Canada and Mexico have each 
brought two separate challenges arguing that COOL violates the TBT 
Agreement.12  At the time of the first complaint,13 COOL required labels to 
include information regarding whether meat was exclusively from the U.S., 
exclusively foreign, or of mixed origin.14  Canada argued these requirements 
violated both the GATT and the TBT Agreement because they treated 
imported products less favorably than domestic products.15  A WTO 
compliance body agreed that COOL violated the TBT Agreement, as the 
labeling requirements were not necessary to fulfill a legitimate purpose.16  
The U.S. appealed this decision to the WTO’s Appellate Body, but was 
unsuccessful.17  
                                                                                                                   
 11 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2.  Consumer demand for information has consistently 
been recognized as a legitimate objective for regulations that discriminate against trade.  Panel 
Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuan Products, WT/DS381/R, ¶¶ 7.379–.623 (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.–
Tuna II] (finding a legitimate objective in consumers’ interest to know whether tuna had been 
collected using dolphin-safe nets). 
 12 See Charles Abbott, New U.S. Meat Label Rule Survive Challenge by Meat Packers, 
REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-meat-labe 
ling-idUSL2N0H71H320130911#fvOqGzjKM2J8gkcz.97 (describing the challenges to 
COOL regulations by Canada and Mexico).  
 13 Canada initiated the first complaint by requesting consultations with the U.S. on 
December 1, 2008.  Request for Consultations by Canada, United States – Certain Country of 
Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/1 (Dec. 1, 2008).   
 14 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild 
and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, 
Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling] (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60 and 65).  
 15 Request for Consultations by Canada, supra note 13.  
 16 Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, ¶ 7.720, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Panel 
Report, U.S.–COOL].  At the request of the U.S., the Panel issued two reports in the form of a 
single document that utilizes separate document numbers and symbols for Canada 
(WT/DS384) and Mexico (WT/DS386) to denote its specific conclusions and 
recommendations for each respective complainant.  Id. ¶ 2.11. 
 17 Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, ¶ 349, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS38/AB/R (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL].  At the request of the U.S., the Appellate Body issued 
two reports in the form of a single document with common descriptive and analytical sections, 
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Based on the Appellate Body’s ruling, the U.S. revised its labeling 
requirements.18  These amended COOL measures required point of origin 
information regarding where an animal was born, raised, and slaughtered.19  
While the U.S. believed the amended regulations would bring them into 
compliance with the WTO, Canada argued that the amendments to the 
regulations were more restrictive and harmful to trade than the previous 
regulations.20  Canada once again challenged the COOL measures, and the 
WTO again invalidated the regulations.21  With Canada threatening 
retaliation, the U.S. appealed the decision.22  In May 2015, the WTO 
Appellate Body responded by upholding the Panel’s decision in a ruling that 
may lead to the repeal of COOL regulations altogether.23 
This Note argues that this entire controversy could have been avoided if 
the original WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports had not 
counterintuitively implied that increasing the amount of information 
collected and conveyed to consumers might justify the COOL measures.  In 
doing so, it will examine the WTO’s review of the TBT Agreement 
challenges, and determine whether the approach is effective in carrying out 
the Agreement’s overriding purpose.  Part II provides information about the 
history and purpose of the TBT Agreement, and explains the review process 
utilized by the WTO compliance bodies that hear disputes between member 
                                                                                                                   
and separate sections containing specific findings and conclusions for Canada (WT/DS384) 
and Mexico (WT/DS386) respectively.  Id. ¶ 15. 
 18 Alan Bjerga & Jen Skerritt, Tighter U.S. Rule on Imported Meat May Cost $192 Million, 
BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/u-s-
tightens-country-of-origin-meat-labeling-after-wto-ruling.html (quoting statement of U.S. 
Sec’y of Agriculture Tom Vilsack) (“USDA remains confident that these changes will 
improve the overall operation of the program.”).  
 19 2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18, at 31368.  
 20 See Nirmala Menon, WTO Panel Decides Against U.S. in Meat-Labeling Dispute, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 21, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/wto-panel-decides-against-u-s-in-meat-lab 
eling-dispute-1408645566 (explaining Canada and Mexico’s claims to the WTO regarding the 
new U.S. COOL regulations). 
 21 Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, 
WT/DS384/RW, WT/DS386/RW (Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II]. 
 22 See Tom Miles & Krista Hughes, U.S. Risks Trade Sanctions in WTO Meat Label 
Dispute, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/21/us-
wto-usa-food-idUSKCN0I91J420141021 (explaining Canada’s opposition to the U.S. COOL 
regulations and the U.S.’s continued support of those regulations); see also Menon, supra note 
20 (reporting that Canada threatened to retaliate with punitive tariffs to recoup their losses 
estimated at $911.5 million annually). 
 23 WTO Upholds Key Rulings Against COOL, Dealing Definitive Blow to U.S., INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE’S DAILY REP., May 19, 2015, available at 2015 WLNR 14614575; House Agriculture 
Committee Approves COOL Repeal Bill After WTO Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 22, 2015, 
available at 2015 WLNR 15216788. 
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nations.  Part II also provides a history of the U.S.–COOL dispute.  Part III 
analyzes whether the review process achieves the objectives of the TBT 
Agreement by considering the Agreement’s application in U.S.–COOL.  Part 
IV concludes that the current application of the “legitimate objective” 
analysis does not achieve the purpose of the TBT Agreement, and that the 
analysis must be modified to prevent future trade-restrictive regulations.24  
II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
DISPUTES 
A.  The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
Prior to establishing the WTO, unnecessary technical requirements made 
trade difficult, causing some nations to call for change.25  GATT was the first 
major attempt at creating cooperation between nations in international trade 
matters.26  It established the “General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment” 
principle, which provided that any privilege granted to one trading partner 
must be similarly granted to all other GATT members.27  In 1979, countries 
established the TBT Agreement in order to further specify the meaning of the 
GATT and better prevent the adoption of protectionist regulations by 
clarifying the exceptions for the protection of human health and safety.28  In 
1995, the WTO was officially formed and the TBT Agreement was 
incorporated into its jurisdiction.29  Since that time, the WTO has 
strengthened the TBT Agreement and made it an integral restriction on non-
tariff measures that affect trade.30   
Currently, the TBT Agreement aims to eliminate regulations that 
unnecessarily burden trade between nations.31  Article 2.1 states that 
“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no 
                                                                                                                   
 24 TBT Agreement, supra note 8.  
 25 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 31. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. at 10–12. 
 28 See Norbert L.W. Wilson, Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS in the 
WTO, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 703, 707–08 (2003) (describing the history and establishment of 
the TBT Agreement); see also TBT Agreement, supra note 8, pmbl. (stating the reasons for 
the TBT Agreement implementation).  
 29 WTO, THE WTO AGREEMENT SERIES: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 5 (2014), 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/tbttotrade_e.pdf. 
 30 Wilson, supra note 28, at 704–05.  
 31 THE WTO AGREEMENT SERIES: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, supra note 29. 
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less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to 
like products originating in any other country.”32  However, the TBT 
Agreement leaves room for trading nations to pursue legitimate objectives.33  
While Article 2.2 does not define legitimate objectives, it provides a list of 
illustrative examples including national security, the prevention of deceptive 
practices, protection of human health and safety, protection of animal and 
plant health, and protection of the environment.34 
B.  Interpreting the TBT Agreement 
All disputes between WTO member nations arising under the TBT 
Agreement are settled by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).35  If a 
member believes another member is violating the Agreement, it may initiate 
the dispute resolution process by requesting consultations between the 
countries.36  If consultations fail, the member may request a panel be 
appointed by the DSB to settle the dispute.37  Panel proceedings are governed 
by the 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).38  The DSU states 
that panels should interpret agreements “in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law.”39 
The customary rules that the DSU refers to are the rules established at the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).40  The 
Vienna Convention establishes that treaties should be interpreted according 
to the ordinary meaning of the text and “in light of [the treaty’s] object and 
                                                                                                                   
 32 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1.  
 33 Id. art. 2.2.  
 34 Id. The list of examples provided in Article 2.2 is not exhaustive; that is, it merely serves 
as a reference point for evaluating other objectives. Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Tuna II, 
¶ 313, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012).  
 35 See generally UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 55–58 (describing the 
settlement dispute process of the TBT Agreement). 
 36 Id. at 56. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 39 Id. art. 3.2. 
 40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (finding 
that the “general rule of interpretation” set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention has 
reached the level of customary international law); Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages II, at 10–12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 
1996) (reaffirming the use of the Vienna Convention to define the customary rules).  
112 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:105 
 
purpose.”41  Thus, any interpretation of the TBT Agreement should be 
consistent with its object and purpose. 
The preamble of the TBT Agreement states one of the purposes of the 
Agreement is to ensure that technical regulations “do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.”42  However, the Agreement also recognizes 
that “no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary . . . for 
the prevention of deceptive practices,” and that the WTO will not invalidate 
those regulations unless they “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries.”43  Together, these provisions allow 
countries to implement certain technical regulations as long as those 
regulations are not discriminatory.44 
C.  Unjustifiable Discrimination 
Claims of unjustifiable discrimination under Article 2 of the TBT 
Agreement first require a determination that the measure in question is a 
“technical regulation.”45  A technical regulation is a “[d]ocument which lays 
down product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions. . . .”46  Labeling 
requirements fall within this definition.47  Next, the panel must determine 
that the products at issue are “like products,”48  which depends on the nature 
and extent of the competitive relationship between products.49  Finally, the 
panel must determine if foreign products receive less favorable treatment 
than similar domestic products as a result of the technical regulation.50  If 
competition is adversely affected to the detriment of the producer of the 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Vienna Convention, supra note 40, art. 31. 
 42 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, pmbl.   
 43 Id.  
 44 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 7.119–.120, 
WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC–Sardines]. 
 45 PEROS C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): 
DOCUMENTS, CASES & ANALYSIS, AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES 264 (2010).   
 46 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, Annex 1, para. 1.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. art. 2.1.  
 49 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); see also Panel Report, 
United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 7.248, 
WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.–Clove Cigarettes] (concluding that 
clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are like products for the purpose of Article 2.1).  
 50 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1.  
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imported products, then the panel deems the regulation as providing less 
favorable treatment.51 
The analysis does not end there.  The panel must still determine whether 
the regulation is justified under Article 2.2.52  This analysis requires the panel 
to identify the regulation’s purpose and determine if that purpose is a 
“legitimate objective.”53  If there is no legitimate objective, then the 
regulation violates Article 2.2.54  Legitimate objectives detailed in Article 
2.2, include national security, the prevention of deceptive practices, 
protection of human health and safety, protection of animal and plant health, 
and protection of the environment.55   
Of particular relevance to this Note is the fact that pervious WTO panels 
have found that meeting consumer demand for information is a legitimate 
objective in the context of food labeling requirements.56  Specifically, these 
panels reasoned that such technical regulations aided in preventing deceptive 
consumer practices—an objective explicitly enumerated in Article 2.2.57   
Merely finding a legitimate objective, however, is not sufficient to justify the 
regulation under Article 2.2. 
After finding a legitimate objective, the panel must decide whether the 
technical regulation is “more restrictive than necessary” to achieve that 
objective.58  If the regulation is more restrictive than necessary, the panel will 
deem it an unnecessary obstacle to trade in violation of the TBT 
Agreement.59  When making its decision, the panel considers whether a 
regulation makes a “material contribution” to achieving the objective and 
whether there are “less-trade [sic] restrictive alternatives” that would make 
an equal contribution.60  Article 2.2 notes that this analysis should account 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Panel Report, U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 49, ¶ 7.208.  
 52 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2. 
 53 Id.   
 54 Wilson, supra note 28, at 710. 
 55 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2.  
 56 Panel Report, U.S.–Tuna II, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.379–.623.  
 57 Id. ¶ 4.88 (stating that dolphin-safe labeling requirements warn consumers about tuna 
caught with nets not safe for dolphins and encourage fishermen to use dolphin safe fishing 
methods).  
 58 Id. ¶ 7.388 (calling for a two-step analysis to determine whether the technical regulation 
pursues a legitimate objective and whether the regulation is more trade restrictive than 
necessary to achieve that objective).  
 59 Wilson, supra note 28, at 710. 
 60 Panel Report, U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 49, ¶¶ 7.326, 7.325–.432 (finding that a 
ban on clove cigarettes made a material contribution to the objective of reducing youth 
smoking, and that there was no proof that less restrictive measures would have the same 
effect); see also Panel Report, U.S.–Tuna II, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.379–.623 (finding that less 
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for the risks of non-fulfillment of the objective by considering available 
technical and scientific information, technology, and end-uses of the 
product.61  If risks of non-fulfillment are too great then the panel may decide 
the regulation is not more restrictive than necessary.62 
III. HISTORY OF THE U.S. COOL DISPUTE 
A.  COOL Legislation in the United States 
1.  Congressional Enactment 
COOL was established as part of the 2002 Farm Bill,63 which required 
suppliers of certain foods to provide country of origin information to 
retailers, and further required retailers to inform consumers of the 
information.64  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) charged the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) with implementing COOL 
requirements, and the AMS published its final rule detailing the requirements 
in 2005.65  However, Congress elected to delay implementation of COOL 
and, in the interim, passed the 2008 Farm Bill.66  As a result, the AMS 
published a new rule in 2009, which stated that labels must provide whether 
meat comes exclusively from the U.S., exclusively from a foreign country, or 
whether it has mixed origin.67 
                                                                                                                   
restrictive alternatives to the dolphin-safe labeling requirements would achieve the same level 
of protection against consumer deception). 
 61 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See DANIELLE GUNN & C. WILSON GRAY, UNIV. OF IDAHO EXTENSION, PUB. NO. C15 
1146, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING (COOL) AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS 1 (2009), available 
at http://www.cals.uidaho.edu/edcomm/pdf/CIS/CIS1146.pdf (describing the inception of the 
COOL requirements). 
 64 Covered commodities include meats, fish, shellfish, nuts, fruits, and vegetables.  7 U.S.C. 
§ 1638(a).   
 65 MELVIN S. DROZEN & ALISSA D. JIJON, A BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN LABELING REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 2, 2014), available at https://www.khlaw.com/A-BRIEF-
HISTORY-AND-OVERVIEW-OF-COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN-LABELING-REQUIREMENTS.  
 66 Id. 
 67 2009 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 14.  
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2.  Key Provisions and Requirements 
Four types of labels existed under the regulation.68  Label A applied to 
meat derived from livestock exclusively born, raised, and slaughtered in the 
U.S.69  Label B applied to meat from countries of mixed origin.70  Label C 
was used for meat derived from livestock imported into the U.S. for 
immediate slaughter.71  Label D was used for meat when the animals were 
neither born, raised, nor slaughtered in the U.S.72   
The regulations also allowed labeling of commingled meat, which 
included meat from different categories that was commingled in a processing 
facility during a single production day.  The chart below represents the 
regulations under the original labeling system:73 
• 100% of the meat is derived from Category A animals
• 100% of the meat is derived from Category B animals
• A & B meat is commingled on a single production day
• A & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• B & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• A, B & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• 100% of the meat is derived from Category C animals
• A & B meat is commingled on a single production day
• A & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• 100% of the meat is derived from Category B animals
• B & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• A, B & C meat is commingled on a single production day
• 100% imported foreign meat
Product of U.S.
Product of the U.S., 
Country X
Product of 
Country X, U.S.
Product of 
Country X
 
  
                                                                                                                   
 68 Id. at 2659. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  The mixed origin label applied to meat that was not exclusively from the U.S. or 
meat that was born, raised, or slaughtered in the U.S., but not imported into the U.S. for 
immediate slaughter.  Id.  
 71 Id.  
 72 Id.  
 73 Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, ¶ 247. 
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B.  International Challenges to COOL Legislation 
1.  The Initial Challenge: U.S.–COOL I 
In 2008, Canada alerted the WTO to its concerns regarding the validity of 
COOL for packaged meat.74  Canada argued that the regulations violated 
both the GATT and the TBT Agreement.75  The Panel agreed, finding that 
COOL violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because the measures 
accorded less favorable treatment to imported meat as compared to like 
domestic meat products.76  The Panel also determined that COOL violated 
Article 2.2, in part, because the measures did not fulfill the regulation’s 
stated purpose of providing consumers information and preventing 
deception.77  The labels lacked meaningful information that would allow 
consumers to make informed purchasing decisions.78  For example, a mixed 
origin label notified consumers that their meat was derived from Country X 
and Country Y, but it did not explain which part of the process took place in 
which country.79  As a result, more accurate information was necessary to 
adequately inform consumers and fulfill the purpose of the regulation.80   
Importantly, the Panel did recognize the regulation achieved some degree 
of success.  Specifically, it found that the labels provided better information 
to consumers than the consumers would have had prior to the 
implementation of the regulations.81  Nonetheless, since the COOL measures 
did not fulfill their legitimate purpose, the Panel ultimately concluded the 
measures were in violation of Article 2.2.82  Additionally, since the Panel had 
already invalidated the regulation, it did not go on to decide whether the 
regulation was more restrictive than necessary to achieve its purpose.83 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Request for Consultations by Canada, supra note 13. 
 75 Id.    
 76 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.546–.548 (relying on a Canadian study 
that found a significant negative impact on the import of Canadian livestock as a result of 
COOL regulations).   
 77 Id. ¶ 7.720. 
 78 Id. ¶ 7.718.  
 79 Id. (explaining that certain labels are “confusing in terms of the meaning of multiple 
country names”). 
 80 Id. ¶ 7.715.  
 81 See id. (stating that COOL provides more information to consumers than existed 
previously).  
 82 Id. ¶ 7.719. 
 83 Id.  
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In 2012, the U.S. appealed the Panel’s decision that COOL measures 
violated the TBT Agreement.84  On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the 
Panel’s ruling that COOL violated the TBT Agreement, but disagreed with 
the Panel’s reasoning.85  The Appellate Body found that the Panel should 
have decided whether the detrimental impacts on foreign products resulted 
from discrimination or from a legitimate regulatory distinction.86  Although it 
went on to complete this analysis, it still determined that COOL violated 
Article 2.1 because the detrimental impacts did not result from a legitimate 
distinction.87  Instead, the detriment occurred because the regulation placed 
disproportionate burdens on upstream producers to track and record country 
of origin information,88 which led most producers to process exclusively 
domestic livestock in order to avoid the record-keeping costs.89  Since the 
regulation’s detrimental impact was not sufficiently related to the legitimate 
objective of conveying information to consumers, the COOL measures 
remained in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.90  
Notably, however, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s ruling that 
COOL was inconsistent with Article 2.2.91  It explained that the Panel 
improperly required proof that “either all of the labels had to provide 100% 
accurate and clear information, or that the COOL measure had to meet or 
surpass some minimum threshold.”92  Instead, the Panel should have 
evaluated the degree of contribution the regulations made in fulfilling their 
purpose,93 and should not have required the regulations to fulfill their 
objective “completely.”94 
The Appellate Body also noted that even though the Panel found less 
restrictive alternatives were available, it still should have gone through a full 
analysis under Article 2.2 to decide whether the regulations were more trade 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, ¶ 1 (explaining that the U.S., 
Canada, and Mexico all appealed the Panel’s decision for various reasons).  
 85 Id. ¶ 293.  
 86 Id. (noting that the Panel’s analysis was “incomplete”).  
 87 Id. ¶ 349.  
 88 Id. ¶ 347.  
 89 Id. ¶ 287. 
 90 Id. ¶ 349. 
 91 Id. ¶ 468.  
 92 Id. ¶ 467.  See also id. ¶ 468 (explaining the panel must have relied on this reasoning 
because the labels provided some valuable consumer information).  
 93 Id. ¶ 461 (explaining that the degree of achievement “may be discerned from the design, 
structure, and operation of the technical regulation, as well as from evidence relating to the 
application of the measure”).  
 94 Id. ¶ 468. 
118 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:105 
 
restrictive than necessary to achieve COOL’s purpose.95  Unfortunately, the 
Appellate Body could not complete the “more restrictive than necessary” 
analysis because the record on appeal did not provide a sufficient basis for 
the decision.96  The fact that the regulations created a disproportionate 
burden on upstream producers suggested the regulations might be overly 
restrictive, but the Appellate Body refused to decide the issue.97  In doing so, 
the Appellate Body left open the question as to whether COOL was more 
restrictive than necessary, and suggested that COOL measures might be 
made valid under the TBT Agreement. 
2.  Revising the Rule: The United States’ Response to the WTO Ruling 
Based on the Appellate Body’s ruling, the U.S. revised its labeling 
requirements in 2013.98  The amended regulation modified the previous 
COOL measures by expanding the amount of required information on labels.  
Under the amended COOL regulations, meat labels were required to provide 
in which country an animal was born, raised, and slaughtered.99  These 
requirements differed from the original COOL measures, which allowed for 
mixed origin designation.100  Instead, retailers acting under the amended 
measures had to provide specific point of production information.101 
As a result of the amendments, several of the Appellate Body’s concerns 
were seemingly remedied.  For example, in U.S.–COOL, both the Panel and 
Appellate Body found the original COOL measures placed a disproportionate 
burden on upstream producers to track information, and encouraged U.S. 
retailers to buy exclusively domestic meat.102  The amended COOL 
measures, however, attempted to remedy imposing record-keeping costs on 
all producers, regardless of an animal’s country of origin.  In theory, this 
should have eliminated the incentive to buy exclusively domestic livestock 
because the price of domestic livestock would similarly reflect the costs of 
record keeping under amended COOL.  The U.S. likely believed that if the 
disadvantages to imported livestock were eliminated, then less favorable 
treatment would also be eliminated.  
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. ¶ 469. 
 96 Id. ¶ 491. 
 97 Id.   
 98 2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18. 
 99 Id. at 31368.  
 100 2009 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 14, at 2659. 
 101 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.18.  
 102 Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, ¶ 287.  
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The U.S. also believed that the amended regulations would resolve the 
Panel’s original finding that the detrimental impact on imported products 
was not the result of a legitimate regulatory distinction.103  The Panel 
previously concluded that the detrimental impact on imported livestock was 
not the result of legitimate regulatory distinction because much of the 
information collected by upstream producers was not actually passed on to 
the consumer.104  In part, it recognized that the information was not passed 
on to the consumer due to exceptions in the regulations.105  These exceptions 
left a large portion of the meat industry entirely excluded from COOL 
regulations.  Nonetheless, producers were still required to track information 
for all of their livestock since they had no way of knowing where or how the 
meat would eventually be sold.  This unnecessary tracking created costs and 
led to a detrimental impact on imported livestock that could not be deemed 
legitimate.106  
Furthermore, even when the original labels conveyed information to 
consumers, the information provided did not correspond to the amount of 
information that producers were obligated to track under the original COOL 
measures.107  Producers complying with the original COOL measures had to 
keep records of where livestock was born, raised, and slaughtered in order to 
provide retailers with the necessary origin information.  However, the 
original measures did not include all of this information on labels, and 
instead arbitrarily listed countries of origin without providing which stage of 
the production process occurred in which country. 
The U.S. believed that amending the COOL measures to include the 
stages of production would solve this unfair burden on producers because 
consumers would actually see all of the information collected.108  This 
                                                                                                                   
 103 2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18, at 31367.  
 104 The Appellate Body did not find sufficient information in the record on appeal to decide 
the issue, but it noted that evidence suggested the regulations were more trade restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate purpose.  Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, 
¶ 491.   
 105 The original regulations exempted entities that were not considered retailers, ingredients in 
processed food items, and products served at food-service establishments.  7 U.S.C. § 1638(a).  
 106 The amended regulations did not modify the exceptions to COOL, and for this reason the 
Panel in U.S.–COOL II still found the detrimental impact did not result from a legitimate 
regulatory distinction.  Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.272.  
 107 Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, ¶ 349.  
 108 The U.S.–COOL II Panel found that the amended measures still provided confusing 
information to consumers because livestock raised in more than one country could be labeled 
as raised exclusively in the U.S. if the U.S. served as at least one of the countries where the 
livestock was raised.  See Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.354.  The confusing 
nature of some labels coupled with the exceptions for processed foods and food-service 
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decision was understandable considering that the Panel and Appellate Body 
in the original U.S.–COOL dispute found that the amount of information on 
the original labels was inadequate. The ruling suggested that putting more 
information on labels might remedy the problem and the U.S. seized the 
opportunity to try to retain its COOL measures.  
3.  Dispute Renewed: U.S.–COOL II 
Almost immediately after the U.S. adopted the amended regulations, 
producers of imported livestock expressed their belief that the regulations did 
not meet WTO standards and discriminated against imported products even 
more than the original regulations.109  The Canadian government agreed with 
these industry groups and requested formation of a WTO panel to evaluate 
the amended COOL measures.110  In 2014, the U.S.–COOL II Panel found 
the amended COOL measures continued to violate Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement.111  
The Panel in U.S.–COOL II found that the amended regulations still 
treated imported products less favorably than domestic products, and no 
legitimate regulatory reason justified the distinction.112  Not only did 
segregation still exist under the amended measures, but it increased after the 
U.S. eliminated the commingling flexibility of the original regulations.113  
                                                                                                                   
establishments led the Panel to conclude that the detrimental impact on imported livestock 
was not due to a legitimate regulatory distinction.  Id. ¶¶ 7.282–.283. 
 109 See North American Meat Institute, Burdensome Country-of-Origin Labeling Rule Will Not 
Satisfy WTO or Trading Partners, But Will Harm U.S. Agriculture (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.meatami.com/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i/90194 (“[T]he U.S. government is 
essentially picking winners and losers in the international marketplace.”); Canadian Cattlemen’s 
Association, U.S. Continues to Discriminate Against Cattle Imports (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.cattle.ca/news-events/news/view/u.s.-continues-to-discriminate-against-cattle-impo 
rts/ (“The United States is continuing to inflict these costs on Canadian producers.”); Canadian 
Pork Council, US Flouting of WTO Ruling on COOL Shocking and Appalling (May 23, 2013), 
available at http://www.cpc-ccp.com/documents/news-releases/COOL_May_23_media_release 
_2_.pdf (noting the “devastating discrimination” of the COOL regulations). 
 110 Request for the Establishment of a Panel, United States – Certain Country of Origin 
Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/26 (Aug. 19, 2013), available at https://docs. 
wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=11887 
3,117305,113648,104336,94619,61814,72904,99959,28101,1026&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=
0&FullTextSearch=. 
 111 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21.  
 112 Id. ¶ 7.284. 
 113 Id. ¶¶ 7.148, 7.169 (finding that when producers had the ability to commingle livestock, 
they could reduce the cost of tracking origin information for each individual animal by 
designating the livestock as having mixed origin).  Under the original measures, an estimated 
20% of producers utilized the commingling flexibility. Id. ¶ 7.126. 
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The amended measures also continued to provide confusing information to 
consumers regarding the point of production.  For example, the amended 
regulations allowed retailers to utilize a “raised in the U.S.” label, even when 
the animal was raised in more than one country.114  The amended regulations 
also maintained exceptions for processed foods and food service 
establishments, which left a large number of products without any country of 
origin information.115  As a result, the U.S.–COOL II Panel concluded that 
the amended measures negatively impacted imported goods, and the impact 
could not be justified as stemming from a legitimate purpose.116  
IV.  MODIFYING THE WTO’S COUNTERINTUITIVE LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE 
ANALYSIS 
The legitimate objective analysis utilized by the original Panel and 
Appellate Body gave reason for the U.S. to adopt more restrictive regulations 
by suggesting that if the U.S. provided more information to consumers the 
regulations could achieve a legitimate objective.  The amended regulations 
appeared justified under the compliance bodies’ reasoning, and the U.S. 
believed the changes would help to ensure compliance with their 
international obligations.  However, the primary purpose of the TBT 
Agreement is to eliminate protectionist regulations.  It fails to serve that 
purpose if any purely protectionist regulation passes scrutiny.  Although the 
Panel and Appellate Body found the original COOL measures violated the 
TBT Agreement, their decisions made implications that prompted the U.S. to 
further specify the regulations, making them even more burdensome on 
trade.  In order to prevent similarly contradictory results from occurring in 
the future, the current legitimate objective analysis must be modified to 
ensure it fulfills the purpose of the TBT Agreement.  
                                                                                                                   
 114 If an animal was raised in multiple countries, and one of those countries was the U.S., 
then the label could designate the U.S. as the sole country of raising.  2013 Mandatory 
Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18, at 31368.  The Panel found this flexibility 
troubling since an animal was considered raised in the U.S. if it spent as little as fifteen days 
in the country before processing.  Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶¶ 7.243–.244.  
 115 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.277.  See also id. ¶ 7.489 (stating that 
simply providing more information may also confuse consumers who find the large amount of 
information difficult to understand).  
 116 Id. ¶ 7.283. 
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A.  The Counterintuitive Nature of the WTO’s TBT Analysis 
The WTO’s current mode of analysis, as evidenced in the U.S.–COOL 
and U.S.–COOL II decisions, encourages countries to adopt more elaborate 
regulations as a means of demonstrating those regulations’ justifiable 
purpose.  Unfortunately, two wrongs do not make a right—enacting 
increasingly complex measures necessarily creates burdens within the 
marketplace.  As a result, the WTO’s analysis is counterintuitive to the 
purpose of the TBT Agreement, which was specifically designed to reduce 
burdens on trade. 
1.  Defeats the Primary Purpose of the TBT Agreement 
Justifying unnecessary burdens on trade clearly violates the purpose of 
TBT Agreement, which was created to facilitate international trade and 
prevent technical regulations from interfering with access to international 
markets.117  Underlying that purpose is the idea that member nations should 
not use regulations to favor domestic producers, which countries often refer 
to as protectionism.118  Member nations agree that protectionist measures are 
disfavored because they reduce competition and harm consumers.119  The 
TBT Agreement was designed to eliminate protectionist measures by 
ensuring that imported products received no less favorable treatment than 
similar domestic products.120  Under Article 2.2, technical regulations are 
permissible insofar as the regulations are not “more trade-restrictive than 
necessary” to fulfill a legitimate purpose.121  However, those regulations that 
are found to be protectionist must be remedied in accordance with WTO’s 
recommendation, or face retaliation from the complaining country; usually in 
the form of tariffs.122 
                                                                                                                   
 117 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 31. 
 118 See Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (describing protectionist regulations as socially wasteful because they 
encourage higher domestic prices and exclude consumers who would otherwise purchase the 
goods at a price exceeding the marginal price if low cost, foreign firms were able to enter the 
market).  
 119 Michael Forman, Foreword to UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 2014 REPORT ON 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 4 (Apr. 2014) (stating that discriminatory measures “reduce 
competition, stifle innovation, and create unnecessary technical barriers to trade”). 
 120 TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1. 
 121 Id. art. 2.2. 
 122 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 5, at 56. 
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Debate exists as to whether the COOL measures are protectionist.  
Although the WTO has thus far refrained from expressly making this 
determination, its rejection of Canada and Mexico’s arguments to the 
contrary123 makes plain the counterintuitive nature of its current method of 
analysis, which disproportionately focuses on the degree to which a technical 
regulation achieves its stated purpose.  Moreover, a recent decision by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) concluding 
that the amended COOL measures were motivated by a protectionist purpose 
further solidifies this point. 
In its original brief to the WTO compliance body, Canada pointed to the 
structure and intent of the regulations as evidence of their protectionist 
nature.124  Canada expressed suspicion about COOL’s true purpose, in part 
because the regulations were implemented as part of the 2002 Farm Bill and 
not part of a larger bill aimed at consumer protection.125  The Farm Bill has 
traditionally provided subsidies to American farms to help create domestic 
jobs.126 Thus, the fact that the COOL measures were placed within the bill 
suggested the goal was not consumer protection, but domestic favoritism. 
The U.S. initially justified the COOL measures as an effort to reduce 
consumer confusion under prior programs, but their solution did not attempt 
to refine these prior programs.127  The original COOL measures clearly failed 
to achieve this stated objective.  The U.S.–COOL I Panel found the original 
measures did not provide consumers with accurate country of origin 
information regarding the mixed origin labels, creating confusion with 
respect to commingling flexibility.128  The amended regulations’ more 
detailed requirements lessened this problem, but still left exceptions for 
processed foods and food service establishments.  These exceptions 
prevented consumers from learning country of origin information for a large 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 16, ¶ 7.580. 
 124 See generally Executive Summaries of the Second Written Submissions of Canada, U.S.–
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R 
[hereinafter Executive Summary of 2nd Submission of Canada, U.S.–COOL], available at 
https://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386r_b_e.pdf (describing Canada’s 
argument regarding COOL’s validity under the TBT Agreement). 
 125 Id. ¶ 24. 
 126 RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS THE FARM 
BILL? 2 (2014). 
 127 Executive Summary of 2nd Submission of Canada, U.S.–COOL, supra note 124, ¶ 26 
(arguing that “[t]he United States cannot use confusion caused by its own voluntary programs 
to justify the COOL measure”). 
 128 See Panel Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.718–.720 (finding the original COOL 
measures’ “mixed origin label” confused consumers by allowing commingling without point 
of production information). 
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percentage of the meat they consumed.129  In U.S.–COOL II, the Panel once 
again found that the measures did not achieve the purpose of conveying 
information to consumers, and justified their finding in part because of the 
unchanged exceptions to the original COOL measures.130  Although the 
Panel did not determine the regulations were protectionist, the fact that the 
U.S. continually failed to achieve its stated objective not only suggests that 
the measures were motivated by protectionism, but also highlights the 
compliance bodies’ inability to identify and eliminate such regulations.  
Mexico further alleged that COOL measures were protectionist because 
they shaped consumer expectations and generated bias against imported 
products when consumers would not otherwise care about the information.131  
The WTO previously acknowledged the possibility that nations could 
manipulate consumer expectations through regulatory intervention.132  The 
claim is that governmental regulations requiring the provision of certain 
information may provoke a desire for information that consumers previously 
had no interest in prior to the implementation of the regulation.  Once 
consumers develop these expectations, the government can then justify the 
regulations as stemming from a legitimate purpose, when in fact the 
regulation was not legitimate at the time of its creation. 
Throughout the U.S.–COOL dispute, the WTO consistently recognized 
the legitimacy of the U.S.’ goal to provide consumers information, but the 
extent to which consumers requested this information prior to its adoption in 
2008 remains unclear.133  If the market intervention theory that Mexico 
alleges is correct, then the objective may not have been legitimate at all.  
Instead the objective may only have appeared legitimate at the time the WTO 
decided the case because a consumer expectation had already been 
established.  Regardless of their merit, however, Mexico’s claims 
demonstrate the susceptibility of the WTO’s current mode of analysis with 
respect to such market interventionist maneuvers.  
                                                                                                                   
 129 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.272. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of Mexico, U.S.–Certain Country 
of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 46, WT/DS384/R,WT/DS386/R [hereinafter 
Executive Summary of 2nd Submission of Mexico, U.S.–COOL], available at https://www. 
wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386r_b_e.pdf.  
 132 See Panel Report, EC–Sardines, supra note 44, ¶ 7.127 (noting “the danger is that 
Members, by shaping consumer expectations through regulatory intervention in the market, 
would be able to justify thereafter the legitimacy of that very same regulatory intervention on 
the basis of governmentally created consumer expectations”). 
 133 Executive Summaries of 2nd Submission of Canada, supra note 16, ¶¶ 24–25 (arguing 
that U.S. cattle producers, and not consumers, were the motivating force behind the original 
COOL measures).  
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Finally, a recent ruling by the D.C. Circuit not only appears to foreclose 
any argument that the COOL measures were motivated by a purpose other 
than protectionism, but also serves to highlight the failure of the WTO’s 
current legitimate objective mode of analysis.  In American Meat Institute, 
the D.C. Circuit looked to COOL’s legislative history in order to determine 
whether the mandatory labels violated the American Meat Institute’s First 
Amendment right against compelled commercial speech.134   In its evaluation 
the court considered whether the government’s interest justified the 
regulations,135 much like how a WTO compliance body evaluates a 
regulation’s legitimate purpose.  The court expressly rejected the 
government’s claim of a legitimate interest in providing consumers with 
information.136  Instead the court concluded that the COOL measures 
actually aimed at supporting American farmers, and that the government 
only denied this interest for fear of “international repercussions that might 
ensue.”137  By recognizing protectionism as the true purpose of the COOL 
measures, the court managed to uphold the regulations as justified by a 
substantial government interest.138  While the court’s justification would 
have invalidated the measure before the WTO, this justification served as the 
key reason for finding the regulation constitutional in the U.S.  
If the D.C. Circuit is correct and the COOL regulations were in fact 
motivated by a protectionist purpose, then the compliance body should have 
invalidated them for that reason.  Their continued justification proves a 
major failure for the compliance bodies’ analysis because they should be able 
to identify and eliminate protectionist regulations without reaching for other 
justifications.   
                                                                                                                   
 134 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 135 The test for determining whether a First Amendment violation exists depends on 
“whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial[,] . . . whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.”  Id. at 28 (Rogers, J., concurring) (quoting Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
 136 Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
 137 Id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
 138 Id. at 33 (stating there was no First Amendment violation because “the Government has a 
substantial interest in . . . supporting American farmers and ranchers against their foreign 
competitors”).  
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2.  Requiring More Information is More Burdensome on Trade 
At first glance, the amended COOL measures may not appear more 
burdensome on trade.  They require both foreign and domestic producers to 
track and record the same information, and both types of producers bear the 
general costs associated with implementing a new system.139  In the amended 
COOL regulations, the AMA acknowledged these increased costs, but they 
did not recognize any disproportionate impact on foreign producers.140  
Rather, the AMA believed that the general costs of implementing the new 
system were nondiscriminatory, and therefore, would not be sufficient to 
support a finding that the regulations violated the TBT Agreement. 
However, the amended COOL measures proved discriminatory in effect.  
Most notably, the amended measures discriminated against foreign producers 
by eliminating commingling flexibility.141  Commingling flexibility is 
important because it allows domestic facilities to process both foreign and 
domestic livestock without tracking country of origin information for each 
individual animal.  As a result, facilities are able to process entire groups of 
livestock in a single day and simply use a mixed origin label without 
knowing exactly which animals came from which country.  Since the 
amended COOL measures required country of origin information for each 
and every specific product, facilities were unable to combine groups of 
livestock during production.  This system incentivized domestic process 
facilities to segregate their operations and process exclusively domestic 
livestock.142  Doing so allowed domestic producers to avoid tracking point of 
origin information for each individual animal; producers could easily record 
information for entire groups at the facility.  Even though domestic 
production facilities could have chosen to segregate their operations so as to 
process exclusively foreign livestock, foreign importers alone were 
insufficient to meet U.S. demand.143  As a result, many producers who 
                                                                                                                   
 139 See 2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18, at 31367 (recognizing 
costs would include developing the labels, printing additional information and purchasing 
equipment); see also id. at 31372 (noting commentators’ objection to the proposed rules 
because it would result in increased printing and equipment costs). 
 140 Id. at 31367 (estimating the cost of new labels at $32.8 million). 
 141 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 16, ¶ 7.167.  The AMA predicted the loss of the 
commingling flexibility would cost retailers and producers approximately $123.3 million, but 
it did not note any disproportionate impact.  2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 
supra note 18, at 31368. 
 142 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.156. 
 143 See id. (noting that even if imports could potentially meet U.S. demand, the imports 
would still come from more than one foreign origin and would lead to the same segregation 
problem). 
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previously utilized the commingling flexibility switched to purchasing 
exclusively domestic livestock, and imported products experienced a 
decrease in demand.144 
The situation in U.S.–COOL is not unique.  It is illustrative of the type of 
harm that results from requiring information in country of origin labeling 
systems.  Segregation naturally occurs because it allows domestic producers 
to decrease their costs and avoid complicated record keeping.  If foreign 
producers were capable of meeting processors’ needs, then there may not be 
an issue; the processor could segregate by utilizing exclusively foreign 
material.  However, in a point of production labeling system, like the system 
created by amended COOL measures, the raw materials must be purchased 
from only one foreign producer or else the domestic processors are left with 
the same complicated record keeping problem they were trying to avoid.  
Processors may be even more likely to segregate in this way considering the 
other potential benefits of a “Product of the U.S.” label, including increased 
demand attributable to feelings of patriotism or efforts to support domestic 
job growth.145  Accordingly, there is a strong incentive for processors to 
purchase exclusively domestic products at the expense of foreign imports.146 
B.  The Counterintuitive Effect of the WTO’s TBT Analysis 
The amended COOL measures were a direct response to the WTO’s 
careful focus on the regulation’s purpose in U.S.–COOL I.  If the WTO had 
not suggested that a more tailored purpose could cure the regulations, then 
the U.S. may never have attempted to amend the COOL measures.  Instead, 
the U.S. increased the regulation’s burden on trade and may have even 
decreased other countries’ abilities to bring successful future challenges.  
These effects directly conflict with the goal of the TBT Agreement itself. 
                                                                                                                   
 144 See id. ¶ 7.174 (finding the existence of a price detriment to Canadian cattle between 
2008 and 2014 and a widening of the price basis at 3% weekly). 
 145 Brian E. Mennecke et al., A Study of the Factors That Influence Consumer Attitudes 
Toward Beef Products Using the Conjoint Market Analysis Tool, J. ANIMAL SCI. 2639 (2007) 
(finding that country of origin information is an important purchasing factor for U.S. 
consumers).  But see Barry Krissoff et al., Country-of-Origin Labeling: Theory and 
Observation, ELECTRONIC OUTLOOK REP. FROM THE ECON. RES. SERV. (Jan. 2004), available 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/326598/wrs0402_1_.pdf (finding that suppliers do not think 
U.S. country of origin labels attract consumers). 
 146 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.157 (“[P]rocessing exclusively domestic 
livestock and meat remains the least costly and most viable business scenario under the 
amended COOL measure.”). 
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1.  Encourages Countries to Implement Elaborate Requirements   
The increased burden on trade resulting from the amended COOL 
regulations was unnecessary because the U.S. would have retained the 
original, less burdensome regulations if the WTO had not invalidated them.  
The U.S. believed the original program adequately informed consumers, as 
evidenced by the fact that it did not require detailed point of origin 
information from the outset.147  The AMA only adopted the point of origin 
requirements in an effort to comply with the original Panel and Appellate 
Body rulings.  While the original regulations may have burdened trade, the 
amended regulations only made the burden more pronounced.  When the 
WTO aims at reducing obstacles to trade, this counterintuitive outcome 
cannot be justified. 
After the most recent Appellate Body ruling invalidated the amended 
COOL measures once again, the U.S. will have to abandon or revise 
COOL.148  In theory, the U.S. could decide to further specify COOL’s 
requirements in an attempt to ensure that the legitimate purpose is fulfilled.  
The Panel’s decision left this possibility open by finding that the amended 
COOL measures were not in violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement.149  Despite the Panel’s overall findings, this decision proved an 
important victory for the U.S.150  Since the Panel did not find COOL in 
violation of Article 2.2, the regulation has potential for successful reform as 
long as the U.S. continues to justify its legitimate purpose.  If the U.S. could 
prove that COOL was not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve its 
purpose, then the measures could be upheld by the WTO.  
Unfortunately, the Panel decision in U.S.–COOL II went even further and 
suggested that making COOL measures more burdensome might satisfy 
WTO obligations.  The Panel ruled that the amended COOL measures did 
not fulfill their legitimate purpose because a large portion of the collected 
                                                                                                                   
 147 See 2013 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 18, at 31368 (detailing the 
amendments requiring additional information about the origin of the animals). 
 148 House Agriculture Committee Approves COOL Repeal Bill After WTO Ruling, supra 
note 23.  
 149 Any revised COOL measures could still be invalidated under the Article 2.1 requirement 
of no less favorable treatment for imported products, but establishing a legitimate purpose 
under Article 2.2 increases the likelihood that the measures as a whole will be upheld.  See 
Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶¶ 7.612–.613 (concluding that the complainants 
failed to make a prima facie case that the amended COOL measures violated Article 2.2 as 
being more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose).  
 150 Id. ¶¶ 7.332–.333 (deciding that there was “no reason to re-open the issue” of COOL’s 
legitimacy because both the original Panel and Appellate Body deemed the purpose legitimate 
and the matter was not raised in the complaints).  
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information never made it to consumers.151  This problem primarily resulted 
from the exemptions for processed foods and food-service establishments.152  
The Panel noted that upstream producers tracked country of origin 
information for all livestock because they could not predict how the product 
would eventually be sold, and this unnecessary tracking created unjustifiable 
costs.153  In its explanation the Panel implied that if the exceptions were 
removed and the measures applied to all products equally, then the legitimate 
purpose might be fulfilled.  
The U.S.–COOL II decision is also troubling for other reasons.  For 
example, the Panel found that the amended COOL regulations’ flexibility for 
labeling where an animal was raised could potentially mislead consumers 
into believing livestock was raised exclusively in the U.S., when in fact it 
was raised in more than one country.154  The Panel relied on this finding to 
determine that the purpose of the regulation was not fulfilled.155  In doing so, 
the Panel appears to have suggested that eliminating this flexibility could 
justify the regulation—once again implying that increasing the regulations’ 
requirements could strengthen their legitimacy.  However, eliminating this 
type of flexibility would restrict trade even further, just as the elimination of 
the commingling flexibility placed additional burdens on imported livestock 
in the original dispute.  The TBT Agreement should not incentivize 
additional discrimination, yet the Panel decision suggests that more 
burdensome regulations may be the solution to bring COOL measures into 
compliance with the WTO’s standards. 
The Panel’s decision demonstrates the continuing inadequacy of the TBT 
Agreement analysis in that it focuses on the degree that a regulation achieves 
its purpose.  This analysis suggests that a country may improve a regulation’s 
validity by implementing even more elaborate requirements.156  Increasing 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Id. ¶ 7.356 (finding that the amended COOL measures made a “considerable but 
necessarily partial contribution to its objective”).   
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. ¶¶ 7.220–.226 (finding the amended regulations increased the recordkeeping burden 
on producers without increasing the proportion of information conveyed to consumers).  
 154 The amended regulations stated that if an animal was raised in multiple countries, and 
one of those countries was the U.S., then the label could designate the U.S. as the sole country 
of raising.  Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.269. 
 155 Id. ¶ 7.282. 
 156 The original Panel found COOL measures invalid because they did not fully achieve their 
purpose.  See Appellate Body Report, U.S.–COOL, supra note 17, ¶¶ 461–466 (discussing the 
flaws in the original Panel’s fulfillment analysis).  The Appellate Body reversed this finding, 
stating that a regulation does not have to fully achieve its objective purpose as long as it 
makes some contribution.  Id.  However, the Appellate Body did not decide what level of 
contribution is sufficient.  Id.  
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the number and specificity of requirements makes a regulation appear more 
justified because more information is conveyed to the consumer.  The 
recordkeeping burden also appears justified when the consumer receives the 
totality of the information collected.  In the case of U.S.–COOL, removing 
the exceptions might justify the burden on producers, but it would do nothing 
to ease the burden.157  Since easing burdens on international trade is the 
primary purpose of the TBT Agreement, the Panel’s analysis should focus on 
this problem and refrain from focusing on the degree in which a regulation 
achieves its objectives.  
2.  Removes Possibility of Success in Future Challenges 
If the U.S. decided to increase COOL’s requirements in response to the 
WTO decisions, one of the only ways Canada and Mexico might 
successfully challenge the regulations would be by proving that consumers 
do not desire country of origin information at all.  If the challenging country 
could prove that consumers do not care about COOL, then the purpose of the 
regulations would be illegitimate.  This would allow a compliance body to 
avoid evaluating the degree to which COOL achieves its purpose by simply 
finding a violation resulted from de facto discrimination. 
In U.S.–COOL II, Canada and Mexico attempted to make this argument.  
The countries presented several studies showing that consumers do not pay 
attention to country of origin information, and that other factors play more 
important roles in consumers’ purchasing decisions.158  For example, Canada 
relied heavily on an empirical study that examined the change in consumer 
demand for packaged meat following the implementation of the original 
COOL measures.159  The study found that demand did not change after 
COOL was implemented, and it suggested that the country of origin 
                                                                                                                   
 157 The producer’s recordkeeping burden would likely remain the same if the exceptions 
were removed.  However, the revised regulations would still require more information than 
before, and the costs of compliance would increase. 
 158 See generally Executive Summary of 2nd Submission of Canada, U.S.–COOL, supra 
note 124.  The U.S. provided similar empirical evidence reaching the opposite conclusion; 
consumers are in fact interested in country of origin information.  See, e.g., Press Release, 
Consumer Federation of America, Large Majority of Americans Strongly Support Requiring 
More Information on Origin of Fresh Meat (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.consume 
rfed.org/pdfs/CFA-COOL-poll-press-release-May-2013.pdf (stating that 90% of people 
surveyed either strongly favored or somewhat favored requiring food sellers to indicate 
country of origin on packages of meat). 
 159 Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.385. 
2015]   THE TBT AGREEMENT’S FAILURE TO SOLVE U.S.–COOL  131 
 
information must not influence consumers’ decisions.160  Other studies 
evaluating COOL measures have reached similar conclusions,161 and support 
the finding that country of origin information does not play a significant role 
in consumer decision-making.  As a result, these studies suggest that COOL 
labels do not serve a legitimate purpose under Article 2.2.  
Despite efforts to prove COOL’s illegitimacy, the Panel rejected 
Canada’s empirical studies by finding substantive and procedural aspects of 
each study that made their application inappropriate.162  In rejecting these 
studies, the Panel concluded that COOL was aimed at a legitimate purpose 
and then went on to consider the level at which COOL achieved this purpose.  
It was during this latter analysis that the Panel implied the U.S. might be able 
to bring COOL into compliance by eliminating the exceptions and 
flexibilities that remained in the amended regulations.  As explained above, 
however, eliminating these exceptions would make the regulations even 
more burdensome, and the TBT Agreement aims to reduce burdensome 
regulations.  Thus, the analysis that justifies these more restrictive changes 
must be flawed as it runs counter to the overall purpose of the Agreement.  
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement states that a technical regulation may 
remain as long as it is not more restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate purpose.  The WTO’s current approach focuses heavily on the 
degree of fulfillment a regulation achieves.  As long as a regulation has 
adequate justification, it will survive scrutiny.  In U.S.–COOL, this metric 
was insufficient to justify the burden and the regulation was invalidated.  As 
a result, the U.S. amended the regulation in an attempt to further their stated 
purpose.  The most obvious way to further the purpose of providing 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Mykel R. Taylor & Glynn T. Tonsor, Revealed Demand for Country-of-Origin Labeling 
of Meat in the United States, 38 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 235, 245 (2013) (explaining that 
change in demand indicates the value consumers place on the information). 
 161 See Katie L. Allen, Courtney Meyers, Todd Brashears & Scott Burris, Out in the Cold 
about COOL: An Analysis of U.S. Consumer’s Awareness of Mandatory Country-of-Origin 
Labels for Beef, 1 J. AGRIC., FOOD SYSTEMS & COMMUNITY DEV. 205, 209 (2011) (finding that 
over 72% of people surveyed never heard of COOL before); Fred Kuchler, Barry Krissoff & 
David Harvey, Do Consumers Respond To Country-Of-Origin Labeling?, 33 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 323 (2010) (finding that country of origin labels on seafood did not affect consumer 
demand); Jayson L. Lusk & Brian C. Briggeman, Food Values, 91 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 184, 
191 (2009) (finding price and safety are more significant than country of origin in a 
consumers decision to purchase).  
 162  See, e.g., Panel Report, U.S.–COOL II, supra note 21, ¶ 7.389 (noting that lack of public 
awareness of a legal program like COOL does not make the information meaningless to 
consumers); see also id. ¶ 7.394 (explaining that finding consumers care more about other 
variables does not necessarily mean that consumers do not care about country of origin 
information at all). 
132 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:105 
 
consumers information was to increase the amount of information consumers 
received.  The WTO had already recognized the purpose as legitimate, so the 
more information the regulations provided, the more they would appear 
justified.  The focus on achievement of purpose in the original Panel and 
Appellate Body decisions inevitably led to this result by analyzing the 
adequacy of the information that reached consumers.  This approach was 
misguided since it prolonged—and may even continue to prolong—the 
existence of a technical regulation that significantly and unnecessarily 
burdens international trade.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Panel and Appellate Body in U.S.–COOL failed in their roles as 
upholders of the purpose of the TBT Agreement.  They gave too much 
weight to the degree in which COOL measures achieved their purpose.  This 
focus led to the adoption of even more elaborate and burdensome 
regulations.  These more burdensome regulations never should have been 
created after the original dispute, and their adoption proves counterintuitive.  
Although U.S.–COOL II invalidated the amended regulations, it still left 
open the possibility that a new set of amended regulations might conform to 
WTO obligations.  Through their current analysis, the WTO allows member 
nations to continually manipulate the purpose of a regulation until it reaches 
an acceptable balance between burden and justification.  This behavior 
cannot be justified under a trade agreement meant to reduce unnecessary 
burdens on trade. Therefore, the current approach must be modified to 
remove the heavy focus on the extent to which a regulation achieves its 
purpose and instead give more weight to analyzing the purpose itself.  If the 
WTO did this in the original COOL dispute, they might have seen COOL for 
what it was: a purely protectionist regulation. 
 
